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Abstract
Wage posting models of job search typically assume that rms can commit to
paying workers the posted wage. This paper investigates the consequences of relaxing
this assumption. Under \downward" commitment rms can commit only to paying
at least their advertised wage. We show that wage posting is always an equilibrium,
although in special cases other equilibria can exist. Surprisingly, the wage posting
equilibrium in our economy is identical to the equilibrium when rms can commit to
paying exactly their posted wage. When rms cannot even commit to paying at least
their advertised wage, equilibrium exhibits job auctions with wage dispersion which
generally are not constrained ecient.
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and Okan Yilankaya for useful comments.Much recent research in the job search literature has adopted the wage posting model
of directed search. Typically in these models, each rm posts a wage, workers look across
all the wage postings and then each worker applies to a single vacancy.1 The successful
applicants are then paid the posted wage. Directed search models have multiple appealing
properties. First, the structure of the job application game usually allows for a structural
matching function to be derived as an equilibrium outcome. These matching functions are
policy invariant thus sidestepping a criticism of standard black-box matching functions
often used in other labour search models. Second, the baseline wage posting equilibrium
is constrained ecient so that no ineciencies are injected into the model due to lack of
microfoundations in the matching process.
However, wage posting models almost always assume that rms commit to paying
workers the posted wage. If workers were allowed to ask for a wage that diered from
the posted wage, would rms submit to such wage demands? How would this aect the
outcomes of standard wage posting models? In this paper we relax the assumption of full
commitment to posted wages by allowing workers to ask for more than the posted wage.
Specically, this paper addresses the question of how such a lack of commitment alters
the outcomes of standard directed search models. We examine two types of commitment
issues : (i) a \downward commitment" case, in which rms can only commit to paying
no less than the advertised wage, and (ii) a \no commitment" case, in which rms cannot
commit to either paying more or less than the advertised wage.
In order to answer these questions our model builds upon the work of Burdett, Shi,
and Wright (2001) and Peters (1991). Firms open job vacancies and advertise a wage that
they will pay a worker. After looking at all the advertised wages, each worker applies to
a single vacancy. In our economy, however, rms cannot commit to paying exactly their
advertised wage. Consequently each worker submits a wage demand along with his or her
job application. As rms cannot commit to the posted wage, workers have an incentive to
demand higher wages. The inability of workers to coordinate their application strategies
means that some rms will receive applications from only a few workers, some rms
will receive only a single application and other rms will receive no applications. Firms
with few applicants may have no choice but to concede to a worker's wage demands.
Importantly, workers are unable to commit to not work for less than their demanded wage
1Galenianos and Kircher (2008) is an example where workers can apply to multiple job vacancies.
1so if a rm chooses an applicant but rejects the initial wage demand, then the rm and
worker bargain over the wage to be paid to the worker. Knowing this, optimal application
strategies result in each rm choosing the applicant oering the lowest wage demand and
paying this wage to the successful applicant. This allows for the possibility of job auctions,
in which rms advertise wages, but the wage bids of competing applicants determines the
wage paid to the successful applicant.2
Perhaps surprisingly, in the case where rms possess only limited, downward commit-
ment, wage posting is, typically, the only equilibrium outcome. In particular, despite the
fact that workers can ask for more than the posted wage, in equilibrium, they choose
not to do so. This result obtains because competition between rms causes rms to post
wages so high that workers prefer not to risk losing out on a job by asking for higher
wages. Furthermore, when rms can commit to paying at least their advertised wage,
equilibrium is always constrained ecient in the sense that a social planner that can open
job vacancies but cannot direct job applications will choose to open the same number of
vacancies as does the competitive economy. This result arises because in submitting their
wage bids, workers internalize the eects that they have on the job nding probabilities
of other workers. In turn, when rms advertise their guaranteed wages, by understanding
the optimal reservation wage bidding strategies of workers, rms internalize the congestion
eect that their vacancy imposes on other rms.
In a special case, namely where workers are credibly able to ask for the full amount
of output created by a match, both wage posting and job auction exist in equilibrium. In
other words, there can be a continuum of equilibria, with dierent mixes of wage posting
and job auctions. All equilibria that consist of job auctions exhibit wage dispersion. In
this special case, equilibria with job auctions are also constrained ecient.
When there is no commitment, such that rms cannot commit to anything except
having a vacancy, the equilibrium outcome is job auctions and equilibrium exhibits wage
dispersion. Typically job auction equilibria are not constrained ecient with the exception,
again, of the case where workers have all the bargaining power in the bargaining phase of
wage determination.
The results of this paper highlight the robustness of the results from the standard
wage posting model and also emphasize conditions under which job auctions and wage
2Shimer (1999) and Peters and Severinov (1997) are two examples of auction papers that have a similar

avour to our model.
2posting are equivalent. Kultti (1999), and more recently Eeckhout and Kircher (2008),
show that auctions and price posting can coexist in equilibrium which resembles the real
indeterminacy result in our paper. However, our paper shows that if workers cannot
credibly ask for the full amount of output created by a match, then equilibrium exhibits
degenerate wage distributions as rms choose to advertise wages that are so high that
workers do not choose to ask for more.3 Therefore, by pointing out a crucial assumption
driving the equilibrium real indeterminacy outcome, our results complement the previous
work that nds equivalence between wage posting and job auctions.
Section 1 lays out the structure of the job search game that is played between workers
and rms and characterizes the equilibrium of a labour market in which rms possess
downward commitment. Section 2 examines the eciency properties of the labour market
with downward commitment. Next, Section 3 extends the model to a labour market in
which rms possess no commitment to advertised wages. A discussion about the results
is carried out in Section 4, and Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
1 The Economy
The economy consists of U homogeneous, risk-neutral, unemployed workers, each of
whom can apply to only one job vacancy, and N homogeneous rms, each of which has
the potential to open one job vacancy. We assume that N is a multiple of U, such that
N = U with  >> 1 so that the number of rms is much greater than the number of
workers.4 The basic production unit of the economy, which consists of one worker and one
rm, produces y units of output.
The timing of events in the job search game is as follows. All rms simultaneously
decide whether to incur a cost, z, to create a job vacancy, and if a vacancy is created
a rm advertises a wage, w, in an attempt to attract job applicants. An implication of
this structure is that a rm does not observe the actions of other rms when making
its decision. Workers observe the advertised wages and choose which rm to apply to.
When applying to a rm, a worker also submits a wage demand to the rm. All workers
submit job applications simultaneously, so no worker observes the application decisions of
other workers. Firms look at their pool of applicants and choose a worker to whom its
3This is the case if, for example, there is bargaining over the wage after the rm and worker meet.
4This avoids potential corner equilibria, in which all rms choose to create a vacancy.
3job vacancy is oered. If the rm is indierent across multiple job applicants, we assume
that the rm randomly selects from amongst these worker with equal probability. Once a
rm selects an applicant to oer its job, it is unable to recall any other of its applicants.
Should a rm not nd any of the wage demands that its applicants submit palatable then
it chooses an applicant and bargains over the wage to be paid to the chosen applicant.
For simplicity of exposition, we take the outcome of the bargaining process to be ^ w, with
^ w  y. This pins down the maximum wage that a worker can credibly demand during the
application phase.5 Unsuccessful applicants remain unemployed and enjoy consumption
of b, which can represent a combination of home production, leisure and unemployment
benets.
In this paper, we study the properties of the large economy where N and U are pushed
towards innity. Given the relationship between N and U, this amounts to taking the
limit as U tends to innity. Importantly, as  is constant, the ratio of workers to rms
is retained in the large economy. This allows use to derive the limiting payo functions
for the players and also to obtain explicit matching functions. This is standard in the
directed search literature (see Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) and Peters (2000)).6 We
consider only symmetric equilibrium in which all rms use the same strategy and all
workers use the same strategy. This is justied by the restriction that rms and workers
are homogeneous and cannot communicate with each other in order to coordinate their
actions, which, given the size of the economy seems to be a plausible assumption. Thus we
solve for the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of the job search game of the large
economy.
Each rm's wage advertising problem is to choose a minimum guaranteed wage to
maximize expected prots taking the strategies of all other players as given. Mixed strate-
gies in wage advertising can be allowed by letting G(w) be the probability that a rm will
advertise a wage less than or equal to w. The entry decision for the rm is then to choose
whether to create a vacancy at a xed cost, z 2 (0;y   b). Let pv be the probability that
a rm chooses to create a vacancy.
5In section 4 we examine how ^ w might be endogenously determined as a result of ex-post wage bargaining
by matched rms and workers. Particularly, suppose that a rm rejects all its applicants' wage demands.
Then when the rm selects one of its applicants and bargains over the wage paid to the applicant, the
outcome of the bargaining process is a wage, ^ w  y.
6The papers referenced above use this technique as a way of showing that the equilibrium in the large
economy can be derived as the limit of the nite economy. In this paper we restrict our attention to the
properties of the equilibrium of the large economy.
4Let a worker's application strategy consist of a function p(w) and, for each possible
advertised wage w, a distribution Fw(w). The function p(w) denotes the probability that
a worker will apply to a particular vacancy advertising a minimum guaranteed wage of
w and the distribution, Fw(w), denotes the probability that a worker will submit a wage
demand weakly less than w when applying to a vacancy with an advertised wage of w.
In solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the job search game and showing its
eciency properties, the following proposition, which is the main result of this paper, will
be proven.
Proposition 1 When rms possess downward commitment the equilibrium of the job
search game is always constrained ecient. Furthermore,
1. when ^ w < y, the equilibrium allocations and payos for workers and rms are iden-
tical to those under a wage posting model where rms can commit to paying their
workers exactly the posted wage, and
2. when ^ w = y, there may exist many equilibria. Particularly, when ^ w = y, equilibrium
payos to workers and rms are the same at any advertised wage in the interval
[b;wp] for an endogenous threshold, wp; that is, real indeterminacy exists.
Under standard wage posting models as illustrated in Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001)
and Peters (2000), the unique equilibrium is such that all rms post the same wage,
workers randomize across all rms with equal probability and equilibrium is constrained
ecient.
1.1 Worker Bidding Strategies
We begin by putting some structure on the application strategies of the workers. First
note that if at least one vacancy advertises a wage w, then p(w) > 0. In order to see this,
suppose equilibrium is such that p(w) = 0 if at least one rm advertises w. Consider a
deviating worker that applies to such a vacancy. Knowing that no other worker will apply
to this vacancy, the deviating worker's best strategy is to submit a reservation wage of ^ w
which is the highest wage a rm will accept. This is the best possible wage that a worker
can receive and the deviating worker is guaranteed this payo. At any other vacancy,
there is a probability that another worker will apply, so the expected payo for a worker
from any other vacancy is strictly less than ^ w.
5Now, some structure can be put on the workers' wage demand strategies.
Lemma 1 For any wage w in the support of G(w) :
1. if 9 an atom in Fw(w) it can only be at w,
2. if 9 a gap in supp Fw(w) then it must be that there is an atom at w and for a w > w,
Fw(w) is continuous on [w; ^ w] so that supp Fw(w) = fwg [ [w; ^ w],
3. otherwise, for a wm > w, Fw(w) is continuous and atomless on the interval [wm; ^ w].
Proof : Construct this proof in steps :
1. First we show that Fw(w) cannot be degenerate for any wage in (w; ^ w] for w with
p(w) > 0. If Fw(w) is degenerate at w0 2 (w; ^ w] then suppose a worker considers
deviating. By oering a deviating wage w00 = w0    for some arbitrarily small 
the worker is guaranteed to obtain a job at any rm advertising w. This results in a
discontinuous increase in the deviating workers expected job nding probability for an
arbitrarily small decrease in expected wages so there is a protable deviation. Taking
the limit as  ! 0 produces a protable deviation. The same logic can be applied to
show that there cannot be an atom in (w; ^ w].
2. Suppose that for w with p(w) > 0, supp Fw(w) contains an open interval so that
Fw(w) has support [w;w0] [ [w00; ^ w]. In order for a worker to be indierent between
w0 and w00 it must be that announcing w0 or w00 yields the same expected payo.
However, as neither w0 nor w00 can be a mass point, the job nding probabilities are
identical. Thus as w00 > w0, this cannot be an equilibrium mixed strategy. Notice
that this argument does not carry over to the case in which there is an open interval
in Fw(w) such that its support is fwg [ [w; ^ w] as there may be an atom at w.
3. If there is no atom at w and no gaps in the distribution Fw(w) with p(w) > 0 then
it must be that Fw(w) is atomless and continuous on [w; ^ w]. 
Thus the distribution of wage demands takes on one of three forms. First, it can take
the form of a standard job auction, in which all workers ask for more than the advertised
wage, and the distribution of bids is continuous with no atoms. In this case, workers ignore
the advertised wage, and it is as if the rm never posted a wage at all. It will be shown
that this occurs when the advertised wage is suciently low.
6The second possibility is that some workers only ask for the advertised wage, but others
ask for more. The distribution has an atom at w, with the rest of the mass distributed
continuously across an interval of wages exceeding the advertised wage. In this case, there
is a range of wages between the atom and the continuous part of the distribution which are
not demanded. This is because workers bidding more than the advertised wage always ask
for discretely more in order to oset the discrete reduction in the probability of obtaining
the job that goes along with bidding a wage above the advertised wage. We call this an
atomic job auction and will show they arise for intermediate levels of the advertised wage.
Finally, the distribution can be degenerate, with all of the mass at the advertised wage.
This occurs when the minimum wage is so high that no workers submit reservation wage
bids that exceed it, as the reduction in the probability of winning the job is too great to
be compensated for by any wage that a deviating worker could credibly ask for. This is
wage posting, and it will be shown to occur when the advertised wage is suciently high.
In the next three subsections we solve for the equilibria of the three possible job appli-
cation subgames and we calculate the expected payos to workers and rms conditional
on choosing to participate in each of these subgames. As vacancies are created prior to the
application stage, we x the number of vacancies to be equal to v. Later, in accounting
for entry of vacancies into the labour market, the expected number of vacancies will be
v = pvN where pv is the probability that a rm chooses to open a vacancy. At the moment
though, what is of relevance is ratio q(w) = p(w)U so we will take pv and v as xed for
now.
1.1.1 The Standard Job Auction
In this subsection we derive the optimal wage bidding strategy for workers, as well
as the expected payos for workers and rms, for a vacancy where the rm advertises a
minimum guaranteed wage in the interval [b;wm].
Conditional on approaching a given rm and demanding a wage w, the expected payo
to a worker in a standard job auction with a minimum guaranteed wage of w 2 [b;wm]
is equal to the probability that no other worker shows up at the chosen rm oering a
wage lower than w times the worker's bid plus the probability that the worker is undercut
by another worker times the payo from unemployment.7 In the large economy where we
7In a standard auction, the wage demand strategies of the workers will be continuous and atomless, so
that the probability that multiple workers submit the same reservation wage is zero.
7look at the limit as U ! 1, while retaining the v   U ratio, this expected payo is given
by
e q(w)Fw(w)w + (1   e q(w)Fw(w))b:
As workers mix across wages in the interval [wm; ^ w], each worker must be indierent
in equilibrium across oering any of these wages. Thus for any wage w 2 [wm; ^ w],
e q(w)Fw(w)w + (1   e q(w)Fw(w))b = e q(w) ^ w + (1   e q(w))b
which can be solved to yield the distribution


















In order to pin down the bottom end of the support, wm, it must be that Fw(wm) = 0 so
wm = e q(w) ^ w   (1   e q(w))b:
The expected utility of participating in a standard job auction and applying to a rm
advertising w can be calculated as
Vs(w) = e q(w) ^ w + (1   e q(w))b:
It is useful to notice that as workers are indierent over all wage demands in [wm; ^ w] then
the expected payo from partaking in a standard job auction is equal to the expected
payo from asking for the highest possible wage, ^ w.
It has already been shown that workers mix across all job vacancies in a symmetric
equilibrium. Letting R be the expected return from mixing across all job vacancies under
the optimal application strategy, the expected return to applying to a job advertising
w 2 [b;wm] is given by
e q(w) ^ w + (1   e q(w))b = R:
This reveals that each worker's indierence condition requires that the expected queue






8the expected queue length at any standard auction is independent of the advertised wage
which is an outcome that will be discussed further later in the paper.
The expected prot for a rm participating in a standard job auction and advertising





= (1   e q(w))(y   b)   q(w)e q(w)( ^ w   b):
In order to understand this prot function, notice that the rst term is equal to the
output created by a match less the participation wage necessary to be paid to the worker
for employment. The second term is equal to the job nding bonus paid to the worker.
Consider the expected wage paid to a worker bidding ^ w. This is paid out by the rm when
the worker demanding ^ w is the only applicant. Such an event occurs with probability
q(w)e q(w). As workers are indierent over all wages in the support of Fw(w) then the
rm is essentially faced with the situation of paying its worker an expected wage bonus
of ^ w   b. Substitution of the rm's expected queue length from conducting a standard
auction the expected prot function becomes
s =

^ w   R
^ w   b

(y   b)   ln





Therefore if a rm advertises a minimum guaranteed wage that results in a standard
auction, the rm will be unable to aect its expected queue length.
1.1.2 Atomic Job Auctions
In this subsection we derive the optimal wage bidding strategy as well as the expected
payos for workers and rms, for a vacancy where the rm sets a minimum guaranteed
wage, w, such that w 2 [wm;wp]. When the advertised wage falls in this interval, the
result is an atomic job auction.
Remark 1 In an atomic job auction the wage strategy of the workers, Fw(w), admits
an atom at the rm's minimum guaranteed wage and for an endogenously determined
threshold, w(w), a continuous support on an interval [w(w); ^ w].
Conditional on approaching a given rm and oering a wage w > [w(w); ^ w], the
expected payo to a worker in an atomic job auction with a minimum guaranteed wage of
9w is equal to the probability that no other worker shows up at the chosen rm oering a
wage lower than w times the worker's bid plus the probability that the worker is undercut
by another worker times the payo from unemployment. For bids w  w this expected
payo is
e q(w)Fw(w)w + (1   e q(w)Fw(w))b










As the workers mix across the minimum guaranteed wage, w, as well as wages in the
interval [w(w); ^ w], each worker must be indierent in equilibrium across oering any of
these wages. Thus for any wage w 2 [w(w); ^ w],
e q(w)Fw(w)w + (1   e q(w)Fw(w))b = e q(w) ^ w + (1   e q(w))b (3)
with
e q(w) ^ w + (1   e q(w))b = R:
The indierence condition in equation (3) can be solved to yield the wage demand dis-
tribution and density functions, which take the same form as in a standard job auction
(equations (1) and (2), respectively).
In order to pin down the bottom end of the support, w(w), it must be that Fw(w) =
Fw(w) so by indierence
1   e q(w)Fw(w)
q(w)Fw(w)
(w   b) = e q(w)Fw(w)(w(w)   b): (4)
Similarly, to pin down the probability with which workers oer to work for the minimum
guaranteed wage, Fw(w), use the indierence condition between w and ^ w. Then
1   e q(w)Fw(w)
q(w)Fw(w)
(w   b) = e q(w)( ^ w(w)   b)
which implicitly denes Fw(w).
Taking the limit as Fw(w) approaches one, the upper threshold for advertised wages
that bring about atomic auctions, wp, can be found to be
wp 
qae qa
1   e qa ( ^ w   b) + b: (5)
10When rms advertise wages above wp workers all submit wage demands equal to wp
because the expected gains from demanding any wage above wp are outweighed by the
costs of not obtaining the job.
The expected payo to the worker from an atomic job auction with minimum guar-
anteed wage w is denoted by Va(w). Note that optimal wage demand strategies require
mixing across w and the interval [w(w); ^ w]. Thus the expected payo from demanding
any of these wages must equal the payo from demanding the highest wage, ^ w, and so
Va(w) = e q(w) ^ w + (1   e q(w))b:
As application strategies call for workers to mix across all job vacancies, in any equilib-
rium it must be that Va(w) = R for all w 2 [wm;wp]. This pins down the expected queue





which is independent of the advertised
wage.
The expected prot for a rm in an atomic job auction with minimum guaranteed









= (1   e qa)(y   b)   qae qa( ^ w   b):
Thus expected prot from conducting an atomic auction is independent of the advertised
wage for w 2 [wm;wp], so a(w) = a. Substitution of the expected queue length, qa into
the expected prot function a it is easily shown that a = s.
Observe that as qa = qs, standard and atomic job auctions are identical in terms of
payos delivered to rms and workers.8 The reason is that when rms advertise wages in
this interval, workers have the incentive to submit reservation wages above the advertised
minimum guaranteed wage. This arises becausd the probability of not obtaining a job by
asking for a higher wage is not suciently large enough to deter the worker from asking
for more. Particularly, workers are willing to demand a wage of ^ w. For all auctions with a
minimum guaranteed wage below wp, a worker who asks for ^ w only obtains the job if no
other worker applies to the given vacancy. As the upper end of the wage demand action
space is the same at all such auctions, and is in the support of the workers' mixed strategies,
this results in all auctions oering the workers the same expected payo. It follows that
8Since the payo functions are identical, workers apply to all job vacancy advertising a wage in the
interval [b;wp] with equal probability. As a result, the q(w)'s are identical across all such vacancies.
11workers and rms are indierent across all vacancies oering minimum guaranteed wages
in the interval [b;wp].
1.1.3 Wage Posting
Consider a rm that is considering advertising a wage in the interval [wp;y   z]. In
this case all workers that apply to the deviator choose to submit a reservation wage equal
to the posted minimum guaranteed wage. Then the expected payo to the worker from













Again, as workers mix across all vacancies in any equilibrium it must be that Vp(w) = R.
1.2 Equilibrium
In solving for the equilibrium when ^ w < y, it will next be shown that all rms will
choose to post a wage suciently high so as to deter workers from asking for more than
the advertised wage. Specically, consider a rm choosing the optimal wage to advertise



















This problem resembles those faced by rms in standard wage posting models as illus-
trated by Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) and Peters (2000) with the exception that the
endogenous lower bound on wages necessary to bring about a wage posting subgame, wp,
potentially constrains the wage choice of rms. As is standard across wage posting mod-
els, the rm faces a trade-o between paying a higher wage and obtaining higher expected
queue length.















(R   b) + b (7)
12with associated expected prot of
p = (1   e qp)(y   b)   qpe qp(y   b)






At the corner w = y   z, it is easy to show that expected prot from opening a vacancy
is negative so this is never an optimal strategy. At the other corner w = wp, optimality




1   e ~ qp (R   b) + b:
Given the expression for the threshold wage wp (from equation (5)), the expected queue
length at this corner is
~ qp = ln

^ w   b
R   b

and so the expected prot at this corner is
~ p =

^ w   R
^ w   b

(y   b)   ln





In order to show that the interior solution is the most protable option for a rm
advertising a wage in [wp;y   z], consider the derivative of the prot function
( ^ w) =

^ w   R
^ w   b

(y   b)   ln





As 0( ^ w) > 0 and 00( ^ w) < 0, when ^ w < y the interior solution, wp, is strictly more
protable than the corner solution, wp. Furthermore, the expected prot at the corner
is identical to the expected prot from any other minimum guaranteed wage in [b;wp].
Therefore, when ^ w < y, wd
p is the optimal wage in [b;y z] for a rm. It is also transparent
that when ^ w = y, the expected prots from oering any minimum guaranteed wage in the
interval [b;wp] are the same as the under wage posting so any advertised wage maximizes
expected prots.
It is easy to show that the expected return to the worker is under wage posting is given
by
Vp = e qd
py + (1   e qd
p)b:
The following Lemma summarizes the equilibrium ndings so far.
13Lemma 2 For cases ^ w < y, a rm's expected prot is maximized by advertising the
minimum guaranteed wage, wp. This results in all workers that approach the deviating
rm submitting a reservation wage of wp. For the case ^ w = y, rms are indierent between
advertising any minimum guaranteed wage in the interval [b;wp] and all advertisements
in this interval maximize expected prots.
Given that  = maxfs;a;pg, in a symmetric equilibrium, given the results of
Lemma 2, when ^ w < y, the expected queue length for each rm is q = qp and the unique
minimum guaranteed wage is w = wp. The equilibrium condition for the expected queue
length in equation (6) pins down entry probability, pv. Zero expected prots from opening
a vacancy requires that in equilibrium
p   z = 0
which implicitly denes the expected return oered by the labour market to the job
searcher, R, so that R satises the entry condition





(R   b)   z = 0:
It has been shown in Lemma 2 that rms want to advertise the wage wd
p 2 [wp;y   z)
if possible. Next it is shown that it is possible for wd
p to be oered in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 When ^ w < y it is always the case that rms post a wage above wp.
Proof : It has already been shown that when ^ w < y rms will choose a wage wd
p 2 (wp;y 
z). Now it is shown that, in equilibrium, wp < y z so that wp is always feasible. Suppose
this is not the case. Then
qpe qp
1   e qp (y   b) + b  y   z
and regrouping terms
(1   e qp)z  (1   e qp   qpe qp)(y   b):
In equilibrium p = (1   e qp   qpe qp)(y   b) and zero prots requires p = z so for
wp  y   z, it must be that
e qpz  0
14which is not possible as this would require qp ! 1 reducing the job nding probability of
a worker to zero. No worker would then apply to such a vacancy, contradicting qp ! 1
as being part of an equilibrium. 
Given Lemma 3, wage posting is always a feasible option for rms in equilibrium.
Furthermore, in a symmetric equilibrium, the queue length adjusts such that the wage
posting interior is always feasible. Thus in the symmetric equilibrium, for ^ w < y, wage
posting is always the outcome.
Importantly, solving the wage posting problem and ignoring the constraint that w  wp
yields the same equilibrium outcome. This establishes that the equilibrium allocations in
our economy are identical to the equilibrium allocations from the standard wage posting
model in which rms can commit to paying exactly their posted wages.
By Lemma 2, when ^ w = y, the expected prots from oering any minimum guaran-
teed wage in the interval [b;wp] are the same. Hence all advertisements in this interval
maximize expected prots, and there is equilibrium indeterminacy. In order to under-
stand the indeterminacy result, it is important to note the double layer of competition in
the economy. In the rst tier of competition, workers compete to obtain jobs by oering
reservation wages while in the second tier of competition rms compete to attract workers
by advertising minimum guaranteed wages. When ^ w = y, competition amongst workers
leads to optimal queue lengths for the rm irrespective of the advertised wage resulting in
rms being indierent across minimum guaranteed wages. However, when ^ w < y compe-
tition amongst workers fails to deliver the optimal queue length for the individual rm. In
response, each rm adjusts its advertised wage in order to aect its expected queue length
resulting in a unique, determinate equilibrium. In the present environment, this means
that rms adjust their wages until the expected job nding bonus paid to the worker
exactly equals the expected surplus generated by a match.
Figure 1 illustrates the isoprot and indierence curves in an equilibrium where ^ w < y.
It can be seen that the point of tangency between a rm's isoprot curve and a worker's
indierence curve occurs at a wage that is strictly greater than the highest minimum
guaranteed wage that results in workers being willing to ask for more than the advertised
minimum guaranteed wage, wp. When minimum guaranteed wages are below wp the rel-
evant portion of the isoprot curves is the horizontal dashed line. This is because in this
interval, workers are willing to submit reservation wages that exceed the minimum guar-






















Isoprofit Curve Under Posting (π = z) 
Indifference Curve Under Posting 
Isoprofit Curve Under Auctions (π = z) 
Indifference Curve Under Auctions 
Figure 1: ^ w < y
anteed wage and so the subgame behave like an auction. For minimum guaranteed wages
equal to or greater than wp, workers do not expect to gain from submitting a reservation
wage above the advertised wage and so the subgame behaves as in the standard wage
posting models, even though rms cannot commit not paying more than their advertised
wage; workers just choose not to ask for more. When wages are above wp then the relevant
portion of the isoprot curves is the segment of the solid isoprot curve to the right of wp
which lies at the end of the dashed isoprot curve. By the same logic, when wages are
below wp, the relevant portion of the indierence curves is the horizontal dashed indier-
ence curve. When wages are above wp, the relevant portion of the indierence curves is
segment of the curved solid indierence curve to the right of wp.
Figure 2 illustrates the isoprot and indierence curves in an equilibrium where ^ w = y.
In this case point of tangency between a rm's isoprot curve and a worker's indierence
curve occurs at any wage that is less than or equal to the highest minimum guaranteed
wage that results in workers being willing to ask for more than the advertised minimum
guaranteed wage, wp.
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Figure 2: ^ w = y
2 Eciency
This section illustrates the eciency properties of the model. The main result is that
equilibria are always constrained ecient when rms possess downward commitment.
2.1 The Social Planner
The social planner planner chooses vacancies to maximize expected aggregate output.
Under the centrally planned economy workers apply to each vacancy with equal probability
which minimizes congestion at all vacancies. Thus the job lling probability is given by
1   e q and the job nding probability is 1 e q
q . The planner's problem is given as
max







where q = u
v. The optimality condition for the social planner is such that
(1   e q
)(y   b)   qe q
(y   b) = z
where the rst term is the expected increase in output from the marginal vacancy, the
second term is the expected loss in output from increased congestion caused by the the
marginal vacancy on the existing vacancies. Importantly the congestion externality is such
17that the social planner only cares about congestion if it means that the marginal vacancy
\steals" its worker from another rm which only has a single applicant. If the worker
obtained by the marginal rm is taken from another rm that has at least two applicants
then no output is destroyed by the creation of this additional vacancy. This interpretation
is easily seen as 1 e q
is the probability that a vacancy receives at least one worker and
qe q
is the probability that a vacancy receives only one applicant.
2.2 The Decentralized Economy with Wage Posting
In the decentralized economy rms must choose the wage that they post and workers
choose their application probabilities based on the vector of posted wages. In equilibrium
workers adjust their application probabilities across rms such that all rms oer the same
equilibrium return. Let R denote the \market return" that the labour market oers to
each worker under optimal application strategies. A rm's problem is to choose its wage
(and thus its expected queue length) to solve















is the probability that the deviating rm receives at least one job applicant
and 1 eqd
qd is the probability that a worker applying to the deviating rm expects to obtain





(wd   b) = e qd
(y   b)
along with the worker's indierence condition from the optimal application strategy, which
is the rm's constraint. By applying to the deviating rm, a worker is guaranteed b and





(wd   b). The optimal queue length for the
deviating rm requires that the bonus paid to the successful applicant is equal to a fraction
of the surplus created by the match, y b, with the weight equal to the probability that no
other worker applies to the deviating rm, e qd
. If we consider e qd
(y b) as the marginal
increase in surplus created by a small increase in the queue length at the deviating rm,
holding constant the queue lengths at other rms, then the condition for optimal queue
length requires that the expected job nding bonus paid by the deviating rm equal this
gain in surplus.
18Rearranging this optimality condition yields a condition on the expected wage payment
by the deviating rm
(1   e qd
)wd = qde qd
(y   b) + (1   e qd
)b:
It can be seen that the expected wage payment by the deviating rm compensates its
applicants for the expected increase in congestion that it creates, which is the rst term on
the righthand side, and covers the successful applicant's loss output from home production,
which is given by the second term on the righthand side. Relating expected wages to
the congestion externality, qde qd
is the probability that only one worker show up at
the deviating rm. Therefore, the expected wage pays the worker a bonus equal to a
share of the additional output created by the match weighted by the probability that the
successful applicant is the only worker that applies to the deviating rm. Note that the
marginal value of having more than one applicant at the deviating rm is zero. Therefore in
considering the appropriate compensation for a worker taking market conditions as given,
the wage paid by rms in the symmetric equilibrium is exactly equal to the congestion
externality created by a rm by opening its vacancy.
Using the workers' indierence condition over job applications, the expected return
from applying to the deviating rm is
e qd
(y   b) + b = R:
Given concavity of the prot function, in a symmetric equilibrium q = qd, so
p = (1   e q   qe q)(y   b)
and by free entry
(1   e q   qe q)(y   b) = z
which is the same as the social planner's optimality condition. The constrained eciency
of the wage posting economy is a well known property.9 The reason the decentralized
economy is constrained ecient is because wage competition between rms in the labour
search market internalizes the congestion eect that rms impose on one another. When
9See Moen (1997) and Peters (2000). Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) illustrate the eciency properties
of a \reservation wage" posting games in which workers post reservation wages and rms direct their search
for workers. Their model exhibits ex post worker auctions such that workers that receive multiple job oers
force the rms to compete in Bertrand auctions.
19a rm considers the value of attracting a single worker and the compensation required
to get workers to direct their search towards its vacancy rms essentially decide to part
with a portion of the surplus created by a match that equals the value to the rm of
obtaining a single applicant. In a symmetric equilibrium, the value to a rm of obtaining
a single applicant is equal to the value of a worker to a rm that losses its only applicant.
In equilibrium this means that all rms consider the eects that their wage policy has
on their queue length which is the equilibrium queue length. Hence in considering the
wage that it will have to pay a worker when it makes its vacancy creation decision, rms
internalize the congestion externality.
2.3 Eciency of Standard and Atomic Auctions
The equilibrium expected prots from opening a vacancy in either a standard or an
atomic job auction are
s = a = (1   e qs)(y   b)   qse qs( ^ w   b): (8)
The rm's expected prot is comprised of two components. The expected surplus left
after paying its worker the participation cost of b and the job nding bonus paid to the
successful applicant. This bonus is equal to the maximum surplus that the worker can
extract via wage demand competition and is paid by the rm if only one worker applies
to the job vacancy.
Free entry requires that
(1   e qs)(y   b)   qse qs( ^ w   b) = z: (9)
Comparison of the social planner's benchmark with the case of standard and atomic auc-
tions reveals that such auctions are constrained ecient with ^ w = y.10
At rst pass, this result is curious as rms cannot oer wages and thus rms do
not have access to an instrument which will allow them to internalize the congestion
externality. Note, however, workers are indierent across all equilibrium bids, which are
are all equivalent in ex ante payos to the bid of ^ w. By bidding the highest feasible
wage, ^ w, a worker will only secure a job if no other applicant applies to the same vacancy.
10Auctions are not constrained ecient when ^ w < y. With downward commitment, rms' advertised
wages only lead to job auctions when ^ w = y. In the next section, we examine the no commitment case, in
which case job auctions occur in equilibrium even when ^ w < y.
20Therefore, in contemplating its highest possible bid, a worker internalizes the maximum
possible surplus it can extract from a rm.
Of course when ^ w = y this is the expected value to a rm from having only one
applicant. In other words, as long as workers can secure the expected surplus from possibly
being the only worker to apply to a rm, then wages will re
ect the expected value to a
rm of having only one applicant. Comparison with the social planner's outcome shows
that this equals the congestion externality created by an additional vacancy.
3 No Commitment
When rms cannot commit to paying more or less than their advertised wage, then
equilibrium is such that standard auctions arise at all vacancies and advertised wages play
no role. The idea is quite simple given the description of equilibrium with downward
commitment. We know that with downward commitment no worker asks for more than
wd
p which is the equilibrium wage and is downward binding. Now get rid of downward
commitment. Consider a rm that advertises a wage w 2 (wp; ^ w). Suppose equilibrium is
such that all workers that apply to this rm demand wages no less than w. Now consider
a single deviating worker that asks for a wage less than w. In this case the rm is best o
hiring this deviating applicant and the applicant obtains the job; a protable deviation is
constructed. Now it is easy to show that equilibrium is such that all rms can only oer
applicants standard job auctions.
As noted in the previous section, auctions are not ecient when ^ w < y. In such cases,
workers are essentially leaving some surplus on the table for the rm whenever a match
is formed. Workers then compete over the remaining match surplus and in these cases,
wage competition across workers do not result in wages re
ecting the full value of a match
to a rm. Under such cases, competition to secure jobs amongst workers do not fully
internalize the congestion externality so that job auctions are not constrained ecient.
Proposition 2 In the absence of commitment, the equilibrium only exhibits standard auc-
tions. The equilibrium is constrained ecient only in the special case where ^ w = y.
214 Discussion
4.1 Determining the Maximum Wage Demand
In previous sections, we took the maximum wage demand that a worker could credibly
obtain, ^ w, as a parameter. In this section we endogenize ^ w as the outcome of ex-post
bargaining over wages.
We start by modeling bargaining as an alternating oers game (Rubinstein (1982)).
Consider a worker and a rm that play the alternating oers game on the interval w 2
[w;y]. The worker makes the rst oer which is denoted wW(1). If the rm rejects this
\wage demand" then it makes a counteroer, wF(2), in the second stage. If the worker
rejects this oer then it makes its rst counteroer, wW(3) 2 [w;y]. Note that once the
worker's rst oer is rejected, the worker's subsequent counteroers are not constrained
by its original reservation wage. Assume that the worker and rm share the same discount
factor,  2 [0;1). Once a worker is selected from a rm's job queue the rm cannot recall
a dierent applicant from its queue.
The worker's initial wage demand, which is determined in the cross-worker competition
to secure a job, serves as the worker's rst oer in the alternating oers game. Here we
determine the maximum wage that a worker can ask for as a credible wage demand in the
job application stage of the game.
Aside from the worker's initial reservation wage bid, this is the setting considered
by Rubinstein (1982), and we can solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium using the





Knowing that ex-post bargaining is feasible as a fall back position, once workers have
submitted their wage demands, the rm will reject any wage demand above ^ w. Therefore,
in the rst stage of the game, workers will only make oers in the interval w 2 [w; ^ w].
Notice that only in the special case where the worker and rm are extremely impatient,
 = 0, will ^ w = y.
An alternative way to model the alternating oer game is to allow for both parties to
incur a xed cost each time an oer is made. For example, consider the case where the
worker incurs a cost of cw each time an oer is made and a rm incurs an analogous xed
cost of cf. The rst oer is made by the worker in submitting a wage demand during the
22job application stage of the job search game. It is well-known that in such a set-up, the
party with the lower cost will extract the entire surplus. In this model, this amounts to
^ w = y when the worker's cost is lower than the rms, ^ w equal to the rm's advertised
minimum guaranteed wage when the rm's cost is lower than the workers and ^ w being
indeterminate but in the interval [w;y] when the worker and rm have equal xed costs.
Closing the model with Nash Bargaining in lieu of the alternating oer game will
result in ^ w = y only if workers have all the bargaining power. These results suggest that
equilibrium indeterminacy, which arises only in the case where ^ w = y, is a special case
that arises only under extreme assumptions about the nature of either impatience or the
distribution of bargaining power in ex-post wage negotiations.
4.2 Ex Post Auctions
Another alteration that could be made to the job search environment is to allow rms
to announce that wages will be determined by an ex post Bertrand auction. In this event,
if only one worker applied to a rm then the worker would obtain ^ w and if a rm obtained
multiple applicants then a worker would be randomly selected with equal probability and
paid a wage equal to the worker's outside option, b. The expected prots from such an
advertisement would be
B = (1   e qB)(y   b)   qBe qB( ^ w   b) (10)
with qB = qs, which is identical to the expected prots from running a standard auction
or an atomic auction. This means that the results carry over to allowing for ex post
auctions. The equivalence between ex post auctions and wage posting was brought to
light in Kultti (1999) with the dierence in his paper being that rms can commit to not
paying more than their posted wage. Thus in his set-up rms will always be indierent
between auctions and wage posting and it cannot be the case that rms strictly prefer
wage posting.11
11Recently, Eeckhout and Kircher (2008) have generalized this indeterminacy result between auctions
and wage posting in the homogeneous worker and homogeneous rm economy when rms can commit to
their posted wage. Coles and Eeckhout (2003) illustrate that indeterminacy can arise in directed search
games if rms can post price schedules that allocate the good depending on the number of buyers that
show up ex post.
235 Conclusion
We have presented a simple model in which we examined the role of incomplete com-
mitment in wage posting models. Surprisingly, when rms can only commit to not paying
less than their advertised wage, the equilibrium outcome is identical to the wage posting
outcome in which rms can commit to paying exactly their posted wage. Specically, all
rms oer the same wage, workers all demand the posted wage and equilibrium is con-
strained ecient. Under a special case, where workers can credibly demand for their wages
to be equal to all the output created by a match other constrained ecient equilibria can
exist which exhibit wage dispersion.
Importantly, the paper oers a theory of when wage posting will dominate job auctions
in equilibrium and hence, emphasizes the robustness of the results typically obtained in
directed search models. Lastly, when rms lack any kind of commitment, equilibrium
only exhibits job auctions that feature wage dispersion and typically are not constrained
ecient.
24Appendix
A Derivations for Standard and Atomic Auctions
A.1 Standard Auctions
For now, we x the number of vacancies to be equal to v = pvN where pv is the
probability that a rm chooses to open a vacancy. At the moment what is of relevance is
ratio q = p(w)U so we will take pv as xed for now. Let a worker's wage strategy be given
by the distribution Fw(w) which yields the probability with which a worker will oer a
reservation wage below w to a rm advertising a wage w.
Conditional on approaching a given rm and oering a wage w, the expected payo
from wages of a worker in a standard job auction with a minimum guaranteed wage of
w 2 [b;wm(w)] is equal to the probability that no other worker shows up at the chosen
rm oering a wage lower than w,

S(w;U;v;w)w   (1   
S(w;U;v;w))b
where 
S(w;U;v;w) is dened as


























































25Substitute the indierence condition of the worker's bidding strategy, wm b = e q(w)( ^ w 
b), to obtain
s(w) = (1   e q(w))y   q(w)e q(w) ^ w   (1   e q(w)   q(w)e q(w))b:
A.2 Atomic Auctions
Conditional on approaching a given rm and oering a wage w, the expected payo
from wages of a worker in an atomic job auction with a minimum guaranteed wage of w is
equal to the probability that no other worker shows up at the chosen rm oering a wage
lower than w,


































where q(w) = p(w)U. However, at the minimum guaranteed wage, the expected payo
from wages of a worker is













i (1   p(w)F(w))
U 1 i 1
i + 1
which sums over the events in which i = 0;1;2;::: other workers show up at the save rm
oering the minimum guaranteed wage in which case the rm randomizes across this set


















26The expected prots of a rm in an atomic job auction with minimum guaranteed

























Then using the indierence conditions that e q(w)Fw(w)(w(w)   b) = e q(w)( ^ w   b) and
^ w   b = 1 e q(w)Fw(w)
q(w)Fw(w)e q(w)(w   b) it is found that
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